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Protecting Children-and Their Families-From Abuse: The
Cleveland Crisis and England's Children Act 1989
Robert E. Rains*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 16, 1989, Queen Elizabeth II gave her Royal Assent
to the Children Act 1989, thereby approving a comprehensive revision of
English law regarding children.1 Divided into twelve main parts, the
Children Act 1989 addresses such issues as custody, change of a child's
name, public (local authority) support for children of families, day care
and, importantly, the handling of cases of suspected child abuse. It is
this last area, protection of children, which undoubtedly provided the
greatest impetus for this broad legislative initiative. This article will describe the prior child protection laws, explore the unfortunate events that
focused public and political attention on gross deficiencies in the preexisting law and practices relating to child abuse cases, discuss the new
provisions relating to protection of children, and attempt to highlight
considerations which should be of concern to American legislatures
when contemplating the "toughening" of state statutes on child abuse.
II. PRIOR LAW ON PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
Prior to the new law, removal of neglected and abused children was
governed by several statutes, principally the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 and the Child Care Act 1980.2 These acts authorized local authorities to protect children at risk through the use of a number of
different legal mechanisms that may be bewildering to the American
family lawyer.
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Family Law Clinic, The Dickinson School of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School (1974). This article is the product of a sabbatical visit to the Leicester Polytechnic School of Law, Leicester, England, in January 1990. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Prof. Richard Card, Head of School, and to the faculty of the Leicester Polytechnic School
of Law, particularly R.D. Mackay who was instrumental in arranging the visit, and Deborah
Ogbourne and Richard Jones for their invaluable aid in providing materials and reviewing drafts.
All opinions expressed herein are those of the author.
I Forwardto HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 at iii (1989) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO THE CHILDREN
Acr].The Children Act 1989 is generally applicable in England and Wales. Id.
2 The prior law is described in the past tense for the sake of clarity, although it will remain
largely in effect until October 1991. Id.

CASE W. RES. J. INTL LV

A.

Vol. 23:255

Care Orders

The Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 Act) authorized a
local authority, constable or authorized person to seek an order from the
juvenile court committing a child to its care. Under Section 1, "Care
proceedings in juvenile courts," if the court was of opinion that any one
of several conditions was met, and that the child or young person was in
need of care or control which he was unlikely to receive unless the court
made an order, the court could issue a "care order." The conditions
were:
(a) his proper development is being avoidably prevented or neglected or his health is being avoidably impaired or neglected
or he is being ill-treated; or
(b) it is probable that the condition set out in the preceding paragraph will be satisfied in his case, having regard to the fact
that the court or another court has found that that condition
is or was satisfied in the case of another child or young person who is or was a member of the household to which he
belongs; or
(bb) it is probable that the condition set out in paragraph
(a) of this subsection will be satisfied in his case, having regard to the fact that a person who has been convicted of an offence mentioned in Schedule 1 to the
Act of 1933, including a person convicted of such an
offence on whose conviction for the offence an order
was made under Part 1 of the Powers of Criminal
Courts Act 1973 placing him on probation or discharging him absolutely or conditionally is, or may
become, a member of the same household as the child
or young person;
(c) he is exposed to moral danger; or
(d) he is beyond the control of his parent or guardian; or
(e) he is of compulsory school age within the meaning of the
Education Act 1944 and is not receiving efficient full-time
education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude (and to any
special educational needs he may have); or
(f) he is guilty of an offence, excluding homicide.
Despite the benevolent sound of the phrase "care order," in fact a care
order issued under the 1969 Act had draconian consequences. Such an
order for compulsory care not only required the local authority to receive
the child into its care, notwithstanding any claim by his parents, but also
vested all parental rights in the local authority with the only exceptions
that the local authority could not change the child's religion and the parents retained the right to consent to adoption.
3 Child Care Act, 1980, §§ 10(3), 10(5).
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The care order remained in effect until the child attained the age of
eighteen 4 (or age 19 if the child was 16 or older when the order was
entered).
Prior to amendments in 1983, the parents had no statutory right to
access to (visitation with) a child in care.' Even with the 1983 amendments, parental access might be terminated in some circumstances.
Note that while the parent retained the right to consent to adoption,
this right was not absolute. Pursuant to section 16 of the Adoption Act
1976, the court could dispense with the parent's consent if consent was
unreasonably withheld or the parent had neglected the child or persistently or seriously ill-treated the child. It was not uncommon for a court
to find that once a child had been away from a parent pursuant to a care
order for a substantial period of time, particularly in light of the parent's
limited access to the child, it was unreasonable for the parent to withhold
consent to adoption. This is precisely what happened in Re F (a minor).7 The trial judge had found that a reasonable mother would conclude that it would be beneficial to the child to have contact with his
mother and that the prospect of contact would be slender if the child was
adopted. He therefore denied adoption and granted the mother access.
The Court of Appeal reversed. Having the welfare of the child as the
first consideration and applying an objective test, the higher court found
that a reasonable mother would not refuse her agreement to the
adoption.
Despite the drastic impact on parents of a care order, the parents
were not themselves considered to be parties to the proceedings. This
lack of party status could severely affect a parent's ability to challenge
issuance of a care order, as demonstrated by the Queen's Bench Division
decision in R. v. Worthing Justices, ex parte Stevenson.' In this case a
two-year-old child was the subject of care proceedings brought by the
West Sussex County Council. Legal aid was granted to the child to enable her to be represented at a hearing. The child's solicitor informed the
court that, in his opinion, there was a conflict between the child's interests and the mother's interests. The mother was unemployed and separated from her husband. As the mother could not afford to pay counsel,
the child's solicitor made application to the court for legal aid for the
mother under the Legal Aid Act 1974. The lower court justices expressed the view that, while they wished to see the mother legally represented and it was desirable in the interests of justice that she be so
represented, as a matter of law they had no power to grant legal aid to
4 Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, § 20(3).
5 Child Care Act, 1980, §§ 12A-12G.
6 Id. § 12B.
7 1 All E.R. 321 (1982).
8 2 All E.R. 194 (1976).
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her as she was not a party to the proceedings as defined in the Legal Aid
Act 1974. The child's solicitor applied to the Queen's Bench Division for
an order of mandamus directing the justices to grant the mother legal
aid. Lord Widgery, recognized that:
In proceedings of this kind the real issue is nearly always between the
local authority and the parents, and one will expect therefore to find
machinery whereby the parents
become entitled to legal aid for the
9
purpose of the proceedings.
Nevertheless he concluded that the mother was not a person brought
before the court. Hence, she was not a party, and therefore she was not
entitled to legal aid.1"
Furthermore, although a parent or guardian was not a party to a
care proceeding and although the hearsay rule applies in juvenile court,
the Queen's Bench Division subsequently ruled that, in a care proceeding, witnesses could testify to out-of-court statements by a parent or
guardian of ill treatment of a child as if the parent or guardian were a
party." Thus, the parent was not treated as a party when it would benefit her and be in the interests of justice, but was treated as if a party when
it operated to the parent's detriment.
The most obvious and devastating consequence of the parent's position as non-party was that the parent had no standing herself to appeal
the imposition of a care order. The parent was limited to filing an appeal
on behalf of the child.12 Where an order had been entered pursuant to
section 32A of the 1969 Act that there was a conflict between parent and
child, it is questionable whether the parent could file such an appeal.
It was not until the Children and Young Persons (Amendment) Act
1986 that parents were fully granted party status in care proceedings in
this one circumstance.1 3 The 1986 Act provided that a parent assumed
party status if an order were made under section 32a of the 1969 Act to
the effect that it appeared to the court that there may be a conflict of
interest between parent (or guardian) and
child. Without such a conflict
14
order, the parent remained a non-party.
9 Id. at 196.
10 The appellate court suggested that new provisions in the Children Act 1975 would have
provided for legal aid to a parent in a care proceeding, but that this case arose before the effective
date of the 1975 Act. Id. at 196.
11 Humberside County Council v. R., 1 W.L.R. 1251 (1977).
12 B. v. Gloucester County Council, 2 All E.R. 746 (1980).
13 The Children Act, 1975, § 64, added a section 32A to the Children and Young Persons Act,
1969, to increase procedural protection for parents. Section 32A provided that if the court entered a
conflict order, the parents could have separate representation. For financial reasons, this was never
fully implemented.
14 Child and Young Persons (Amendment) Act, 1986, § 3. See The Law On Child Care and
Family Services, 1987 Cmnd. 62, p.14, para. 55.
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B.

Interim Care Orders

In the situation where there was insufficient evidence to support one
of the conditions for issuance of a care order, the local authority could
seek, and the court could grant, an interim care order under the 1969
Act. 15 This order committed the child to the care of the local authority.' 6 The statutory provision was silent as to whether any evidence at
all was necessary for such an order. Rather, it only provided:
If the court before which the relevant infant is brought in care proceedings is not in a position to decide what order, if any, ought to be
made under the preceding section in respect of him, (the court may
make - (a) an interim order; or (b) an interim hospital order within the
meaning of (section 38 of the Mental Health Act 1983), in respect of
him; but an order shall not be made in respect of the relevant infant in
pursuance of paragraph (b) of this subsection unless the conditions
which, under (the said section 38), are required to be satisfied for the
making of an interim hospital order in respect of a person convicted as
satisfied in his case so far as they
mentioned in
17 that section are
applicable).
The maximum duration of an interim care order was twenty-eight days.' 8
However, the local authority could seek and obtain repeated interim care
orders in the same case. The Act set no limit on the number of interim
care orders in any one case. Further because each order expired within
twenty-eight days, the limited rights to appeal an interim order could
readily be frustrated. As noted in Regina v. Birmingham Justices, Ex
parte S. 19: "But where the statute only allows adjournments of up to
twenty-eight days at a time, it is clear that old orders may be replaced by
new orders and that from time to time the right of appeal will be lost."'2
C. Place of Safety Orders
Another temporary removal order under the prior law was the
"place of safety" order. Section 28(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 provided:
(1) If, upon an application to a justice by any person for authority to
detain a child or young person and take him to a place of safety, the
justice is satisfied that the applicant has reasonable cause to believe
that 15 Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, § 2(10).
16 Id., § 22(2).

17 Id., § 2(10).
18 Id, § 20(1).
19 I"W.L.PR 618, 623 (1984).
20 Id
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(a) any of the conditions set out in section 1(2)(a) to (e) of this
Act is satisfied in respect of the child or young person; or
(b) an appropriate court would find the condition set out in section l(2)(b) of this Act satisfied in respect of him; or
(c) the child or young person is about to leave the United Kingdom in contravention of section 25 of the Act of 1933 (which regulates
the sending abroad of juvenile entertainers), the justice may grant the
application; and the child or young person in respect of whom authorization is issued under this subsection may be detained in a place of
safety by virtue of the authorization for twenty-eight days beginning
with the date of authorization, or for such shorter period beginning
with that date as may be specified in the authorization.
Note that the application for a place of safety order went to a single
justice and that the justice needed only to find that the applicant (not the
justice) had reasonable cause to believe that the child was at risk.
As with interim care orders, place of safety orders effectively could
not be appealed by parents. This is illustrated by the decision in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Quick.2 1 Here, as was usually the case, the
local authority had obtained a place of safety order detaining a child.
The parents applied to the court for the child's release under section
28(6) of the 1969 Act which provided:
If while a person is detained in pursuance of this section an application
for an interim order in respect of him is made to a magistrates' court or
to a justice, the court or justice shall either make or refuse to make the
order and,22in the case of a ref6al, may direct that he be released
forthwith.
The parents' application was ultimately denied. Justice Eastham reasoned that the parents were attempting to use section 28(6) to make an
appeal and that this was an abuse of process as Parliament had provided
no appeal from a place of safety order.23 Sir John Arnold P. concurred
in the result noting "that it was universally held that it was a pity that
there was no right of appeal against a place of safety order but two
wrongs did not make a right."'2 4
In another variation, a constable was authorized by section 28(2) of
the 1969 Act to commit a child to a place of safety if he believed that one
of the conditions for a care order was satisfied. In this situation the child
could be detained for up to eight days with no judicial hearing
whatsoever.25
21 12 Farn. L. 145, (1982).

22 Children and Young Persons Act, 1969, § 28(6).
23 Supra note 21.
24

Id.

25 See, eg., R. v. Bristol Justices ex parte Broome, 1 All E.R. 676, 1 W.L.R. 352 (1987).
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D. ParentalRights Resolutions - Section 3 of the Child Care Act 1980
Another mechanism for involuntarily vesting parental rights in a local authority was found under Section 3 of the Child Care Act 1980.
Under Section 2 of the 1980 Act a parent could voluntarily place a child
in the care of a local authority on a temporary or indefinite basis. For
example, a single mother might place her children with a local authority
because she was about to be hospitalized. The danger to the parent was
that, if it then appeared to the local authority that the parent was unfit or
disabled from caring for the child, the local authority could pass a Parental Rights Resolution under Section 3 of the 1980 Act vesting in the local
authority the parental rights and duties with respect to the child. This
Resolution thereby changed the child's placement from voluntary to involuntary on the part of the parent.
Indeed, if a parent voluntarily placed her child in the care of a local
authority and subsequently notified the local authority of her desire to
resume care of the child, the power of the local authority to care for the
child did not automatically terminate. The House of Lords ruled, in
London Borough of Lewisham v. Lewisham Juvenile CourtJustices,26 that
the local authority could continue to hold the child and either pass a
parental care resolution or take out a wardship summons.2 7
Note that a Section 3 resolution was an internal mechanism of the
local authority. It did not require an application to a court. The parent
was to receive notice and could object to the resolution within thirty
days.28 Such a counter-notice authorized the local authority to file a
complaint in juvenile court which would trigger a hearing. The resolution would remain in effect until a determination of the complaint at the
hearing as to whether the grounds for such a resolution existed.2 9 If the
juvenile court found that such grounds existed, it could order that the
resolution not lapse.30 For obvious reasons this type of intervention, effected without
initial judicial process, had been subjected to strong
31
criticism.
E.

Wardship Proceedings
Another vehicle for removing parental authority from parents was

26 2 All E.R. 297 (1979). This case arose under prior statutes, but the decision remained applicable under the Child Care Act 1980.
27 For a discussion of wardship proceedings, see Section II, E, infra.
28 Child Care Act, 1980, § 3(2)-(4). Under the Act a resolution only applied to one parent. If
the local authority wished or needed to proceed against both parents, two resolutions were required.

29 Id. §§ 3(5)-(6).
30 Id. § 3(6).
31 See A. BAINHAM, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE STATE 78-89 (1988); Maidment, Administrative Proceduresfor the Removal ofParentalRight" The Child Care Act, 1980, Section 3, PROVIDING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN (H. Geach and E. Szwed eds. 1983).
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to be found in the use of wardship proceedings. Although wardship proceedings could be initiated by a local authority, the end result was somewhat different from that under the previously discussed mechanisms, as
wardship vested control of the child with the court rather than the local
authority.
What is striking to the American family lawyer is that a local authority, having failed to make out a case for a care order, could initiate
wardship proceedings and succeed, with no change in the underlying
family situation. This is precisely what happened in Re D. (a minor).32
The local authority had obtained a care order in 1972, pursuant to the
Children and Young Persons Act 1969, but on the parents' petition in
1976, the court discharged the care order, subject to a supervision order
for three years. The local authority was dissatisfied with the supervision
order. Accordingly, the local authority made the child a ward of court
and applied in the wardship summons for a care order to be made in its
favor.
The court noted that different standards apply under the 1969 Act
than under wardship proceedings. Under the 1969 Act, the court must
first find that one of the conditions of a care order exists and that the
child is in need of care and control before considering the welfare of the
child. (But do these two findings not directly relate to the welfare of the
child?)
In a wardship proceeding, on the other hand, the court opined that
the welfare of the child is considered "first, last and all the time." The
court not only granted the wardship, but encouraged local authorities to
apply for wardship in other cases "because in very many of these cases it
is the only way in which orders can be made in the interests of the child,
untrammelled by the statutory provisions of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969."" 3
F

MatrimonialProceedings

Finally, under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a court was ordinarily to enter a custody order before making absolute a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage.3 4 Where, however, the court found
"exceptional circumstances making it impractical or undesirable for the
child to be entrusted to either party to the marriage," the court had authority on3 5its own motion to commit the child to the care of a local
authority.
Moreover, even after the decree absolute, the court had ongoing au32 3 All E.R. 481 (1977).
33 Id.

at 486.

34 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 41.
35 Id. § 43.
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thority to modify a prior order granting custody to one parent and vest
care in the local authority. This is precisely what occurred in R. v. G
(Surrey County Council intervening).6 In that case there was a continu-7
ing custody dispute between two parents who were divorced in 1979.1
In 1984, after hearing the dispute between the parents on several occasions, the court committed both children to the care of the local authority."8 Although both parents appealed, seeking to have the children
placed with the father,3 9 the court of appeal upheld the trial judge. The
court of appeal noted that the standard of review of such an order was
that it not be overturned unless "plainly wrong" or "wholly wrong."'
Interestingly, the court had vested the care of both children in the local
authority, even though the local authority intended to leave one of the
children with the father. The father argued that this intention demonstrated that it was not "impractical or undesirable" for this child to be
entrusted to him. The court of appeal disagreed, noting that the order
would allow the authority to remove the child from him "promptly and
to the court... if their experiwithout the expense of further recourse
41
ment proves to be unsuccessful."
This multiplicity of legal mechanisms with differing standards and
procedures for protecting and removing children at risk from their parents understandably had been criticized by various commentators.4 2 Indeed, a government White Paper, "The Law on Child Care and Family
Services" published in January 1987, was highly critical of the "lack of
clarity" in the child care laws; it called for rationalization and simplification of existing legislation.4 3 However, it was not until the events in 1987
that became known as the "Cleveland Crisis" that there arose a real public outcry for change.'

III.

THE CLEVELAND CRISIS

After significant media attention, Mr. Stuart Bell, Member of Parliament for Middlesbrough and a member of the Bar, raised in Parliament in June 1987 his concerns over the extraordinary events which were
3 All E.R. 460 (1984).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
Id.
40 Id. at 462.
41 Id. at 466.
42 See, eg., Cole, Care Proceedingsin the USA - Some Lessonsfor the UK?, 13 FAm. L. 224
(1983); see also BAINHAM, supra note 31; Maidment, supra note 31.
43 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, DEPr. OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, THE
36
37
38
39

LAW ON CHILD CARE AND FAMILY SERVICES 3 (1987).

44 See A. BAINHAM, CHILDREN, THE NEW LAW, THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 3-4 (1990).
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then culminating in his district.4 5 In July 1987, the Secretary of State for
Social Services ordered that a Statutory Inquiry be established to look
into the arrangements for dealing with suspected cases of child abuse
there in the Cleveland area.' The Inquiry was announced in the House
of Commons by the Minister for Health on July 9, 1987, to examine the
"unprecedented rise in the diagnosis of child sexual abuse during the
County of Cleveland, principally at
months of May and June 1987 in the
47
Middlesbrough General Hospital."
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Elizabeth Butler-Sloss chaired
the Inquiry. There were seventy-four days of testimony, and in June
1988, Lord Butler-Sloss delivered to the government her Report and recommendations, over 300 pages in length.4 8 The scenario described in the
Cleveland Report combines undoubted cases of extremely serious child
abuse, numerous cases of false or unsubstantiated charges of child abuse,
over-reliance on medical signs of debatable significance, breakdown of
relationships among governmental units, overwhelming of public facilities to care for children, misuse or questionable use of the legal mechanisms described above, and real harm to children-and their parentscaused by over-zealous individuals earnestly seeking to protect abused
children.
The Cleveland Crisis, in retrospect, can be traced back to the appointment of Dr. Marietta Higgs to the newly created post in consultant
pediatrics to the Northern Regional Health Authority effective January
1, 1987.49 Dr. Higgs is a specialist in pediatrics with a special interest in
child abuse.5" In 1986, Dr. Higgs attended a conference in Leeds on
child sexual abuse arranged by the British Association for the Study and
Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (BASPCAN) where she heard a
lecture by Dr. Jane Wynne, another pediatrician.5 1 Dr. Wynne advocated that child sexual abuse is more common than generally believed,
that it is deleterious to children, and that anal abuse might be detected by
physical examination of the anus.52 The critical sign which purportedly
is indicative of anal abuse is known by various terms but was commonly
referred to as reflex anal dilation (R.A.D.).53
The lecture made a great impression on Dr. Higgs, and she did not
45 HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, REPORT OF THE IN-

QUIRY INTO CHILD ABUSE IN CLEVELAND 1987, 163,

1

9.3.8, 9.3.9, 9.3.10 (1988).

46 Id. at 1, 11
47 Id. at 1, 12.

48 Id. at 169, 1 9.4.12.
49 Id. 111, 1 8.5. 1.
50 Id. at 131, 11 8.8.1-8.8.6.
51 Id. at It 8.8.5, 13.1, app. B.
52 Id. at 131, %8.8.6.
53 Normally, when a child's buttocks are separated during a medical examination, the external
sphincter contracts tightly and then returns to its previously tonal position. With R.A.D., the anal
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later recall that Dr. Wynne's views were controversial.14 One month
later Dr. Higgs made her first diagnosis of child sexual abuse relying in
large part on the finding of R.A.D. 5
Upon taking the position of consultant pediatrician, Dr. Higgs was
based mainly at the Maternity Hospital and at Middlesbrough General
Hospital. At the latter, she joined among others Dr. Geoffry Wyatt, also
a pediatrician. 6 In March 1987, Dr. Wyatt first examined a child with
Dr. Higgs for suspicion of child abuse. Dr. Higgs called Dr. Wyatt in,
and it was the first time that he observed R.A.D. Although he was senior to Dr. I-Eggs, he "deferred to her greater experience in child abuse"
and presumed, greater knowledge of child sexual abuse.5 7 On April 7,
1987, Dr. Wyatt made his first diagnosis of child sexual abuse in one of
his patients, based in part on observation of the R.A.D. sign, and referred
the case to Social Services.5 8
Meanwhile, tension and "fundamental differences of view" had already arisen between Social Services and the Police. Two cases in particular crystalized the breach. 9 On February 17, 1987, a six-year-old girl
was seen at a clinic at a health center, having physical signs which caused
her mother to believe that she was being abused.' Dr. Higgs and a police surgeon conducted an examination and, based on Dr. Higgs' presumed expertise, they diagnosed sexual abuse.6 1 The child later
identified her grandfather as the perpetrator.6 2
The police arrested the grandfather; and although he protested his
innocence, "he was charged and subsequently bailed by the Magistrates
Court on condition that he live in a bail hostel.",63 The child returned
home, "but then on [March 10], during a check-up at the hospital, Dr.
Higgs diagnosed further anal abuse during a period when the grandfather
had no access to the child." 64 At a case conference on March 11, the
senior police surgeon, Dr. Alistair Irvine, asked if he could examine the
child but Dr. Higgs would not agree to a further examination. 65 "The
child then remained in the hospital where, on [March 16], Dr Higgs diagcanal muscles are weak and over-stretched, or have lost their normal tone, and the anal canal opens.
Id. at 186, §§ 11.13-11.15.

54 Id. at 131,

8.8.5, 8.8.6.

55 Id. at 131-32,

56 Id. at 14,

57 Id. at 146,

8.8.7.
3; 145, 8.9.1; 260, App. B.

8.9.7.

58 Id. at 146, 8.9.8.
59 Id. at 58, 4.36.
60 Id. at 58, 4.37; 91-92, 16.30-6.33.

61 Id. at 91,

6.30.

62 Id. at 92,

6.31.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

at 92,

6.31.

266
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nosed yet further recent abuse."' 6 6 The child then recanted her accusation against her grandfather and named her father as the perpetrator.'
The police withdrew proceedings against the grandfather and began to
entertain serious doubts about the reliability of Dr. Higgs. 8
A second case occurred on March 19, 1987, when Dr. Higgs diagnosed anal sexual abuse of, first, a two year old boy and subsequently his
older sister and brother.69 The police then conducted a very lengthy interview of the older brother in the presence of his father, as they suspected that the brother was the perpetrator.70 The social workers were
critical of the way the police handled the referral, and the police remained dubious of Dr. Higgs, although later examinations by other pediatricians viewed the children's physical signs as consistent with sexual
abuse.7 1
Starting in April, 1987, diagnoses of child sexual abuse primarily by
Dr. Higgs, secondarily by Dr. Wyatt, sometimes confirmed by other doctors, began to multiply. 72 On April 30, Dr. Higgs diagnosed two children in foster care as having been sexually abused. 73 The three children
of the foster parents were likewise found by her to have been sexually
abused.7 4
A decision was made to initiate wardship proceedings for the five
children. 7' The police, however, determined that there was insufficient
basis to pursue criminal proceedings.7 6 Within a few days, Dr. Higgs
had examined nine children who had been in the foster home and determined that eight of them showed signs consistent with anal abuse.7 7
During the period of May 1 to 8, twenty-three children were admitted to
Middlesbrough General Hospital, most of whom were made subjects of
place of safety orders.78 Many were part of the foster home investigation;
others were diagnosed by Dr. Higgs as showing signs of sexual abuse
after being examined during their attendance at pediatric out-patient
66

Id.

67 Id.
68 Id. at 92, 1 6.32. Remarkably, after the child was removed from her family and placed in
foster care, on June 23, Dr. Higgs diagnosed that she had been sexually abused yet again. Id. at 92,
16.33.
69 Id., p. 59, 11 4.38-4.44; 92, 11 6.34-6.36.
70 Id.

71 Id. at 92, 6.34.
72 Id. at 59, 1 4.46.
73 Id. at 59, 4.47.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 59-60 1 4.48
76 Id.
77 Id. at 60, 4.53.
78 Id. at 61, 1 4.56.
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clinics.7 9 The large number of children admitted in this period began to
0 Foster placements after release
strain available resources for them.
8
'
premium.
a
at
were
hospital
from
On the weekend of May 22-24, 1987, there was a second wave of
fourteen children admitted to the hospital with suspected sexual abuse.8 2
By this time the "Cleveland Crisis" was in full swing. The Police refused
to rely upon the diagnoses of Dr. I-Eggs. 3 Indeed on May 29, the Chief
Constable "issued a directive advising officers to treat any diagnosis of
Dr Higgs based on 'anal reflex dilation' with caution and to look for
substantial corroboration of her findings before taking positive steps."8 4
Yet the Inquiry concluded that despite her general denial, in fact, Dr.
Higgs had refused to allow the police surgeon to examine the children
concerned, at least in some cases.8 5
There was a third wave of twenty children suspected of having been
sexually abused admitted to the hospital on the weekend of June 12-13,
1987.86 Between June 12 and June 20, a total of thirty-three children
from seventeen families were admitted to Middlesbrough General Hospital on diagnoses of sexual abuse.8
The mass admission of children on suspicion of child abuse-plus
the doctors' methods-had adverse effects upon the hospital's nurses.
Nurses on the wards complained about the activities of Drs. Higgs and
Wyatt. 8 One nurse complained that the doctors wanted to wake up and
examine a child in the middle of the night, "who had not been admitted
for sexual abuse ... to provide a control to compare [to] the abused
children." 9 Nurses complained that children were being given intimate
examinations late at night. 90
They complained that the parents were asking them what was happening with their children, but that the doctors had not informed nurses
either. 91 The wards were overloaded with children suspected of being
sexually abused, "making the care of... physically ill children... extremely difficult." 92 Dr. Higg's response was to "get more nurses," not
79 Id. at
80 Id. at
81 Id. at
82 Id. at
83 Id.at

61, 44 4.56-4.57.
61, 4.59.
62, T 4.67.
62, 4.69; 64, 4.79.
65, 4.87.

84 Id.

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

166, 9.3.22, (para.
125, 8.7.46.
72, 4.137.
125, 1 8.7.46.
126, 1 8.7.56.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 126,
92 Id. at 128,

8.7.53.
8.7.70.
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understanding that there was no money in the budget for more nurses.9 3
By mid-June 1987, a state of crisis also existed in the Social Services
Department. 94 "[A]ll the foster homes were entirely full and... appropriate childrens' homes were almost full."
At about this time, Mr. Stuart Bell, MP, became involved in the
Crisis. He visited Middlesbrough General Hospital on June 19 and 20,
and spoke to parents. 96 Parents had multiple complaints. They complained that their children were brought to the hospital for examination
and then they waited long periods before Dr. Higgs arrived. 97 They complained that their children were taken from them late at night to be taken
for late night examinations at the hospital. 98 They complained that their
children were examined and, in some instances, photographed without
their consent. 99 Some complained of complete lack of access to their
children."0 0 The Inquiry later concluded that there was a general isolation of parents who were left alone and with no professional support. 101
Mr. Bell's concerns were heightened when the police surgeon, Dr.
Irvine, stated on television on June 26 that the Police had been excluded
from investigations into sexual abuse. 102 Also that evening another television show carried the story of magistrates who had refused a care order
on three children alleged to have been sexually abused. 0 3 Mr. Bell then
called for the suspension of Drs. Higgs and Wyatt.104 He was outraged
when he later learned that the three children were not reunited with their
parents after the magistrates court hearing, but that the local authority
made them wards of court.10 In July, Mr. Bell was quoted as saying
that no parent should take a child to the Middlesbrough General Hospital without first seeking legal advice. 106
Understandably given the nature of the accusations against the parents, the questions about the doctors and the sheer number of cases, the
media became deeply involved in the Cleveland Crisis. They played an
important role at all stages, and by the end of June, the Crisis was being
brought to national attention in Britain by television, radio and
93 Id. at 127, 1 8.7.57.
94 Id. at 77, 1 4.174.
95 Id.

96 Id. at 76, 1 4.170.
97 Id. at 37, 1 2.9.
98 Id.

99 Id. at 38-39, 1 2.12-2.18.
100 Id. at 41, IN 2.30, 2.34.
101 Id. at 46, 11 2.64.
102 Id. at 164, 1 9.3.20.
103 Id. at 163,
9.3.12.
1o4 Id.
105 Id. at 164, 1 9.3.21. See supra Section II, E.
106 Id. at 156, 18.13.9.
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newspapers.1 o7
Under the bright light of Parliamentary scrutiny and intense media
interest, the Regional Health Authority took steps to bring the Crisis
under control. On June 25, Dr. Liam Donaldson, the Regional Medical
Officer, directed Drs. Wyatt and Higgs "not to undertake any examinations to look for signs of sexual abuse in children without parental
knowledge and permission except in circumstances where a court order
removes the necessity for such permission."' 10 On June 28 the Regional
Health Authority decided to establish a mechanism for all new cases to
be seen by a second pediatrician and, wherever possible, a child psychiatrist."°9 Dr. Donaldson resisted pressure to suspend Drs. Higgs and Wyatt, but they were relieved of their clinical duties by mid-September 1987
because of their involvement with the Parliamentary Inquiry.' 0
As of June 1988, the Inquiry found the following overall statistics
arising from the Crisis:
In total 125 children were diagnosed as sexually abused between February and July 1987, 121 of them by Dr Higgs and Dr Wyatt - 78 by
Dr Higgs, 43 by Dr Wyatt. 67 of the children became wards of court.
In the wardship cases 27 were dewarded and went home with the proceedings dismissed; 24 went home on conditions which included supervision orders on the children and conditions as to medical examination
of the children and 2 of them went home on interim care orders. 9
other children who are wards of court remain in the care of the County
Council and away from their families. Of those children not made
wards of court, a further 27 were the subject of place of safety orders.
In all 21 children remain in care.
We understand that out of the 121
1
children, 98 are now at home. '
The Inquiry also noted the role of the courts in this Crisis. Obviously the sheer number of cases placed pressure upon the courts. Many
of the problems with the court system noted in Part II, supra, were illuminated and perhaps magnified. While the statistics are not free of ambiguity, it appears that in most cases the local authority gained control of
children through place of safety orders. All but one application for such2
an order were made ex parte, and all such applications were granted."
There was virtually no recourse for parents who were refused access or
had access restricted under place of safety orders or interim care orders.11 Moreover, the number of cases exacerbated delays within the
107 Id. at 168,

9.4.1; 76,

1 4.166.

108 Id. at 115, 8.5.24.
109 Id. at 115, 1 8.5.27.
110 Id. at 117, 11 8.5.38-8.5.41.
M"Id. at 21, 164.
112 Id. at 172, 1 10.6.
113 Id. at 174-75, 10.19; 178, 1 10.38.
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system. There were difficulties in finding and appointing guardians ad
litem.t14 The Inquiry also noted the use of wardship proceedings where
a care order had been refused.11 The Inquiry endorsed substantial
changes in the child protection laws including many of the recommendations contained in the government White Paper, The Law on Child Care
and Family Services, 1987 (Cm. 62).116
IV. THE NEW ACT
Within less than a year and a half of publication of the Report of the
Cleveland Inquiry, Parliament had enacted the Children Act 1989.
While the care provisions of the Act do not precisely track the recommendations in either the 1987 White Paper or the Report, nevertheless
the Act clearly shows the impact of the Cleveland Crisis and those two
documents.
The Act reenacts the welfare principle, that when a court determines any question with respect to a child's upbringing or property, "the
child's welfare shall be the court's paramount consideration."' 1 7 However the Act also adds the principle of non-intervention:
Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more
orders under this Act with respect to a child, it shall not make the
order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so would be
better for the child than making no order at all. 118
The non-intervention principle is aimed not only at removing the
courts from intervening in amicable custody arrangements in divorce
cases, but also ensuring that they will not enter care or supervision orders
except where such orders can be expected to improve the child's situation. There was concern that, in the past, courts entered such orders
when the statutory grounds were met without adequate regard to the
ultimate benefit or detriment to the child.11 9
Part III of the Act governs voluntary services by local authorities to
children and their families; Part IV governs compulsory care. 12 0 The
Child Care Act 1980 is entirely repealed, as are relevant sections of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1969.121 Under the new Act, there is a
sharp distinction created between voluntary provision of services and
114 Id. at 176, 10.26; 178-79,
10.39-10.44.
115 Id. at 177, 10.36.
116 Id. at 252-53; 306-311.
117 Children Act, 1989, § 1(1).
118 Id. § 1(5).
119 Introduction to the ChildrenAct, supra note 1, at 3. See also A.
at 15-16.
120
121

Children Act, 1989, §§ 17-42.
See A. BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 59.

BAINHAM,

supra note 41,
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compulsory care. The former procedure for converting a voluntary
placement into compulsory care by means of 1an
administrative resolution
22
no longer exists, and has not been replaced.
The distinction between voluntary services and involuntary care is
highlighted by the different terminology used in Part II and Part IV. A
child voluntarily placed by a parent with a local authority is not "in
care;" rather services are being provided. 123 The authority does not assume parental responsibility over a child who is a voluntary placement;
rather such a child is being provided "accommodation" if placed for a
continuous period of more than twenty-four hours. 2 4 The authority has
only specified duties toward such a child, and has not legally replaced the
parents. 125 "Thus, the authority has only those decision-making powers
over upbringing which parents (or others with parental responsibility)
delegate to it expressly or impliedly for the purpose of looking after the
child .... ,12

To make clear the distinction between voluntary accommodation
and involuntary care, Part III expressly precludes a local authority from
providing accommodation where a parent objects who is willing either 1to
27
provide accommodation or arrange for accommodation of the child.
Because the local authority does not assume parental responsibility over
a child in voluntary placement, there is no longer a requirement that a
parent give notice twenty-eight days in advance of removing such a child
after six months 128 To the contrary, the new Act provides:
Any person who has parental responsibility for a child may at any time
remove the child from accommodation
29 provided by or on behalf of the
local authority under this section.'
130
This effectively overrules the Lewisham case.
Moreover Part III imposes a duty of consultation on local authorities with regard to any child whom they are looking after or proposing to
look after. Before making any decision with regard to such a child,
..a local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, ascertain
the wishes and feelings of Id. at 59-60.
123 See especially Children Act, 1989, § 22(1) (and titles of Parts ITT, IV).
124 Id. § 22(2).
125 Id. §§ 22-23.
126 A. BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 91.
127 Children Act, 1989, § 20(7).
128 A. BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 60.
129 Children Act, 1989, § 20(8). This does not apply where there is a residence order in force
and the person or persons in whose favor that order is made agree(s) to the accommodation, nor
where the child is held by virtue of an order under the High Court's jurisdiction. Id. See A.
BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 68-69.
130 See supra note 26.
122
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(a) the child;
(b) his parents;
(c) any person who is not a parent of his but who has parental
responsibility for him; and
(d) any other person whose wishes and feelings the1 authority
31
consider to be relevant, regarding the matter to be decided.
This requirement is in stark contrast to the complaints of Cleveland parents of being kept uninformed as to what was happening with their
children.
The new Act eliminates the multitude of pre-existing mechanisms
for involuntary control over a child by a local authority and replaces
them with essentially one statutory provision: care and supervisions orders. The Act provides:
On the application of any local authority or authorised person, the
court may make an order (a) placing the child with respect to whom the application is
made in the care of a designated local authority; or
(b) putting him under the132
supervision of a designated local authority or of a probation officer.
The same legal standard is required for imposition of either a care or
supervision order:
A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is
satisfied (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm is attributable to (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the
order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to
expect a parent to give him; or
33
(ii) the child's being beyond parental control.1
Although the courts are not entirely divested of wardship jurisdiction, such jurisdiction has been so restricted as to preclude its use for
compulsory care.13 Thus Re D. (a minor) is vitiated. 135
131 Children Act, 1989, § 22(4).
132 Id., § 31(l).
133 Id., § 31(2). By allowing the court to enter a care order on the basis that the child "is likely
to suffer" significant harm, the act expands prior law. Case law had held that an order could not be
based solely on perceived risk of future harm. Essex County Council v. TLR & KBR (Minors), 8
Farn. L. 15 (1978). See A. BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 99.
134 The Children Act, 1989, § 100(2) provides:
No court shall exercise the High Court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to children (a) so as to require a child to be placed in the care, or put under the supervision, of a local
authority;
(b) so as to require a child to be accommodated by or on behalf of a local authority;
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In addition to care and supervision orders, there are four mechanisms for investigation and emergency protection. A court may grant to
local authority a "child assessment order" where the local authority has
reasonable cause to suspect that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer,
significant harm.13 6 The court may provide that the child be kept away
from home if it is necessary for the purposes of the assessment. 137 A
child assessment order is limited to seven (7) days. 138 A court may grant
to any person an "emergency protection order" if there is reasonable
cause to believe that a child is likely to suffer significant harm if he is not
removed. 139 Such an order is limited to eight (8) days, but may be extended another seven (7) days. 4" A constable may also take a child at
risk of suffering significant harm into police protection for no more than
seventy-two (72) hours.14 1 The court may also issue an interim care order or interim supervision order if it is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the standards for a care or supervision order
exist, but the proceedings are adjourned or the court orders an investigation. 4 2 Under no circumstances can an interim order be effective for
more than eight weeks.' 43
Subject to these time-limited exceptions, therefore, a care order is
the sole basis for a local authority to hold a child involuntarily. The new
Act clarifies the legal effect of such an order:
While the care order is in force with respect to a child, the local
authority designated by the order shall (a) have parental responsibility for the child; and
(b) have the power.. .to determine the extent to which a parent
of the child may meet his parental responsibility for
or guardian
1 44
him.

Although the local authority assumes parental responsibility over a
child in care, the Act creates a strong presumption in favor of reasonable
contact with the child by his parents. 145 As with children in voluntary
(c) so as to make a child who is the subject of a care order a ward of court; or
(d) for the purpose of conferring on any local authority power to determine any question
which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any aspect of parental responsiblity for a child.
135 See supra note 32.

136 Children Act, 1989, § 43.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id., § 44.

140
141
142
143
144

Id., § 45.
Id., § 46.
Id., § 38(1), (2).
Id., § 38(4).
Id., § 33(3).

145 Id., § 34(1).
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accommodation, there is a duty on the local authority of consultation
regarding decisions concerning children in care. The local authority
must, as far as reasonably practicable, consult with the child and his parents. 4 6 The local authority's parental responsibility does not include the
right to consent to adoption, change a child's religion nor remove a child
from the United Kingdom.14 7
The Act tackles one procedural problem and sidesteps another.
Under prior law a parent could not petition in his own name to discharge
a care order; rather he could only do so in the child's name. This lack of
independent standing had significant implications for the parent. For example, a guardian ad litem could defeat any effort of a parent to appeal
the denial of a discharge application.148 Under the new Act, a child or
any person who has parental responsibility for the child may apply for a
discharge order. 149
The Act is far less clear with regard to party status generally for
parents. As noted above, lack of party status has significantly impaired
parents' procedural rights in the past. Rather than tackle this problem,
the Act defers it to be addressed in future Rules of Court. Such rules
may, in particular, make provisionas to the persons entitled to participate in any relevant proceedings,
whether as parties to the proceedings or
by being given the opportunity
150
to make representations to the court.

It is anticipated that the Rules (not available at this writing) will rectify
this situation consistent with the recommendations in the White
Paper. '
147

Id., § 22(4). See supra text accompanying note 131.
Children Act, 1989, §§ 33(6), 33(7).

148

A.R. v. Avon County Council 16 Fam. L. 150 (1985). See A.

146

BAINHAM,

supra note 44, at

121.
149 Children Act, 1989, § 39(1).
150 Id., § 93(2)(b).
151 A. BAINHAM, supra note 44, at 187. Paragraph 55 of the White Paper states:

The Government recognise the advantages of involving in the proceedings anyone who
has a proper interest in the child's future and his welfare. Some movement has been made
in that direction by the Children and Young Persons (Amendment) Act 1986, under which
a parent or grandparent can, in certain circumstances, be made a party to the.proceedings
in addition to the child and the applicant. That change in the law removed the more
obvious shortcomings in the present arrangements. For the future, the position will be
further improved. Anyone whose legal position could be affected by the proceedings will
be entitled to party status. Hence, those who already have legal responsibility for the child,
normally parents or the child's legal guardian, will be parties. In addition, anyone who is
permitted to seek and is seeking legal responsibility for the child in the proceedings will be
able to be a party. This will include anyone seeking a custody order such as a parent or
stepparent or a person who is qualified to apply for a custodianship order. If the first two
limbs of the proposed grounds for a care order (see paragraph 59) are satisfied, anyone who
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS TO DEAL
WITH CHILD ABUSE

Unquestionably, the Children Act 1989 represents a progressive legislative achievement by the Parliament. Not yet implemented, it should
protect children, but also protect their parents and thus foster the family
unit. There is of course an inherent conflict between these two goals. If
the law errs on the side of protection, abuse will be suspected where it
does not exist, children will be removed from their families, and harm to
all will result. If the law errs on the side of a severe definition of abuse
and procedural protections, abuse cases will be undiscovered or unrectifled and harm-if not actual tragedies-will result.
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in criminal law effectuates our societal preference that it is better that a criminal go free rather
than an innocent person be wrongfully convicted. While the public may
theoretically agree with this policy choice as a general principle, the
thought of innocent and defenseless children being harmed by those who
are supposed to nurture them might well cause the public's balancing to
be tipped if the suspected crime involves child abuse. Wherever we draw
our lines, they will be both underinclusive and overinclusive.
Child abuse will go unpunished and uncorrected in some cases, and
will be wrongly imputed in others. Perhaps the only way to eliminate
parental child abuse entirely is to remove all children from the care of
their parents, a course rejected by the United States Supreme Court over
sixty years ago. 152 In any event such draconian measures could not preclude abuse by the alternative care givers.
The inability to resolve this dilemma does not justify inaction, and
the United States certainly cannot be accused of inaction in this area.
Child abuse has been the focus of much legislative activity 153 and judiestablishes he has a proper interest in the child and who wishes to have custody of the child
will be able to be a party. See also, supra note 43.
152 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (rejecting notions of child rearing propounded by Plato and practiced in ancient Sparta).
153 In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania where the author supervises a family law clinic, the
General Assembly has enacted in recent years: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2223.1 (Purdon 1988)
(child care administrators must do background search on prospective employees for child abuse); Id
tit. 24, §§ 1-111 (background checks for school teachers); Id tit. 18, § 2711(a) (arrest in domestic
violence cases without warrant if officer has probable cause without having witnessed incident); Id
tit. 42, § 5984 (videotaped depositions, testimony by closed circuits television, use of anatomically
correct dolls in child abuse cases); Id tit. 11, § 2204 (funeral directors mandated to report suspected
child abuse); Id tit. 35, § 10182 (multiple amendments to Protection From Abuse Act making it
easier to file actions); Id tit. 11, § 2231 (establishing Children's Trust Fund to finance programs and
services for child abuse prevention); Id tit. 42, § 5985 (out of court statement by child abuse victim
made admissible under certain circumstances); and Id tit. 23, § 5303 (limiting custody and visitation orders to parents with a history of child abuse).
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cial scrutiny in recent years.1 54

As American law continues to grapple with this problem, it behooves us to consider how the law went awry in Cleveland. The most
obvious disparity between American and British law is the lack of a Brit-

ish constitutional mandate of due process of law. The American constitutional guarantee of due process, articulated in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution,155 has long been held to
apply to a parent's interest in maintaining care and control of a child. As
the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services:151 "This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children'" is an
important interest that "undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a
1 57
powerful countervailing interest, protection."
In a series of decisions the Supreme Court has applied the due process clause to parents in the context of termination of parental rights,
albeit with mixed results. 5 Only one due process case has reached the
Supreme Court involving removal of a child from a parent without the
actual termination of parental rights. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court
grappled with removal of illegitimate children from their father upon the
death of their mother without a hearing regarding the father's fitness.
The children were made wards of the state and placed with court-appointed guardians. The Supreme Court held:
We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was
154 At the U.S. Supreme Court level recent decisions related to child abuse include: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (right of accused to in camera examination of investigation
file by trial judge); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (right to confront accuser violated by closed
circuit television testimony of victim); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (damages not available for returning child to abusive father); Baltimore City Department of
Social Services of Bouknight, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 900 (1990) (duty of parent to comply with court
order to produce child); Idaho v. Wright, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3139 (1990) doctor's hearsay
testimony of child abuse prohibited by Sixth Amend. absent particularized guarantees of trustworthiness); and Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (closed circuit testimony by child
abuse victims allowed where there is a case-specific finding of necessity).
155 Applicable to the Congress and the States respectively.
156 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
157 Id. at 27
158 Quilloin v. walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (absent father's due process rights not violated by
state adoption procedures); Lassiter v. Dept. Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no automatic right
to counsel in termination proceedings); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (clear and convincing evidence required to terminate parental rights); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (natural
father's rights not violated by state adoption procedures); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (man claiming to be natural father of child born to married woman not entitled to hearing on
paternity over husband's objections). Additionally, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979),
the Court found that a state's adoption procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore did not reach the due process issue.
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entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to
all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the
State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1' 9

Against this background, it is fortunately unthinkable that American courts would countenance the legal fiction that parents are not parties to child care proceedings, cannot fully engage in cross-examination,
cannot challenge lack of access or cannot appeal the taking or continued
holding of their children by a local authority.
However, Cleveland raises important issues not satisfactorily resolved in American law. While the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
applies to criminal proceedings involving alleged child abuse, the
Supreme Court has never addressed the burden of proof for removal of
children from their families on a temporary basis (which all too often
stretches out indefinitely). In Santosky v. Kramer,1" the Court found
that clear and convincing evidence is required for termination of parental
rights. Considering the devastating effects on children and parents 6 ' of
a wrongful removal because of an inaccurate claim of child abuse, it is
time that legislatures and courts delineate the burden of proof for courtordered removals under child protective services acts.
Likewise the Court has never addressed the right to counsel in proceedings for removal of children. In Lassiter, 62 the Court declined to
find an automatic right of a parent to counsel in proceedings to terminate
parental rights. Given this background, it is unlikely that the Court
would find such a right in child removal proceedings. Yet surely the
Cleveland Crisis demonstrates that the private interests at stake, the government's interests in protecting children but also avoiding wrongful removals, and the risks of erroneous decisions,16 3 all warrant serious
consideration by state legislatures of heightened due process procedures
including right to counsel.
Directly related to due process concerns is the over-reliance on medfindings
and testimony. It is noteworthy that in Cleveland, as the
ical
crisis developed, the norm was that the only medical testimony (or statement) proffered was that of the physician diagnosing child abuse. Indeed
when the police surgeons began to doubt the accuracy of the diagnoses,
159 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
160 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

161 Beyond the obvious sundering of the family relationship and the labelling of parents as
child abusers, state statutes frequently contain secondary punishments such as prohibitions on visitation and on employment in areas such as schools and day-care centers. See supra note 153.
162 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
163 These are the factors utilized in Lassiter, as originally propounded in Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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they were simply denied the opportunity to conduct second examinations. Parents were ill-equipped or unequipped to combat the medical
testimony which presumably was based upon scientifically valid tests. As
noted above, one of the steps which ended the Cleveland Crisis was the
establishment of a second opinion panel.'"
Finally, by mid-June 1987, a court was for the first time presented
with conflicting medical testimony regarding whether a child had been
abused. "It was the first time (in the experience of the Chairman of the
Juvenile Panel) that Teesside magistrates had been invited to assess the
quality of conflicting medical evidence provided by experts in child
abuse."' 165 Contrast the situation of a jurist in a child abuse case where
the only medical evidence is that a child has been sexually violated, with
the situation of conflicting medical testimony.
Understandably, in the first case, any jurist is likely to credit the
medical expert over the parent claiming innocence. The jurist likely will
have no way of knowing if the scientific basis of the testimony is controversial within the medical community. 16 6 Without the conflicting medical testimony, if valid conflicting testimony could be offered, the jurist
has insufficient evidence to assess the facts. The medical sign relied upon
to diagnose anal abuse of children in Cleveland remained the same from
the beginning to the end of the crisis. The way that sign was treated by
the legal system ultimately changed, but only after many families' lives
were disrupted, perhaps forever.
The United States has not recognized a due process right to a second
medical opinion in child abuse cases. In light of Cleveland, the importance of such an opinion can hardly be doubted. In this regard it is critically important that the second medical opinion come from a physician
who is truly independent of the physician making the original diagnosis.
Two colleagues at the same hospital or other institution cannot be expected to bring the appropriate degree of objectivity. In the Inquiry, parents complained that Dr. Higgs and Dr. Wyatt had purported to provide
diagnoses. For obvious reasons, parsecond opinions as to each other's
' 167
ents viewed this as a "farce."
Often the parents who are subject to allegations of child abuse are
those least able to arrange and afford a second medical opinion. Legislatures must consider establishing statutory procedures for second examinations and opinions in appropriate situations.
Ironically, in 1983, the article "Care Proceedings in the USA164
165
166
167

See supra note 109.
Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987, 173, §§ 10.12-10.13.
See supra notes 54 & 57.
Report of Inquiry, at 37-38, §§ 2.10-2.11.
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Some Lessons for the UKT?" 6 warned of the lack of procedural safeguards in the U.K.'s child care laws and suggested British consideration
of American due process ideas. Sadly it took the Cleveland Crisis to
persuade the U.K. of the desirability of fully recognizing the parental
interests involved. The Report of the Inquiry into the Cleveland Crisis
unequivocally concluded, "... there was disruption of the lives of people,
169
with serious consequences to the children and families concerned...
The fact the Inquiry further found no intention to make a fundamental
attack on family life'7 ° in no way mitigated the terrible damage inflicted.
One must hope that the as yet unpublished Rules of Court implementing
the Children Act 1989 fully effectuate due process for parents in
England.
One must also hope that the dire consequences of lack of due process for the parents of Cleveland will give pause to American legislatures
in their zeal to protect children in future legislation. The heinous nature
of child abuse, particularly child sexual abuse, can all too readily evoke
an emotional response that causes the law to fail to sustain Constitutional
guarantees in the tide of prevailing current opinion. 7 ' If and when this
happens, children and their families can be seriously harmed.

Cole, supra note 42.
169 Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland 1987, 165, § 9.3.22.
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171 Maryland v. Craig, -

U.S. -, 110 S. Ct 3157, 3171 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

